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  1 
The Dispensability of Metaphor 
Many philosophers claim that metaphor is indispensable for various 
purposes. What I shall call the Indispensability Thesis is the claim that: 
We use at least some metaphors to think, to express, to communicate, 
or to discover what cannot be thought, expressed, communicated, or 
discovered without metaphor. 
Versions of this thesis are advocated in a remarkable variety of areas: one 
finds it supported by aestheticians, metaphysicians, linguists, philosophers of 
language, philosophers of science, and philosophers of religion. But one finds 
it more often asserted than argued for. I wish to examine arguments for it. I 
shall argue that support for the Indispensability Thesis is based on several 
confusions.   
 
I 
Stephen Yablo defends a version of the Indispensability Thesis by 
linking metaphor to make-believe.1 Influenced by Kendall Walton,2 Yablo 
points out that the real properties of props used in a game of make-believe 
can help determine what we are to imagine in that game. For example, if the 
mud-cake is, in reality, too big for the tree-stump, we are to imagine that the 
pie is too big to fit in the oven. Because of this, we could make an assertion 
within a game as  
a way of giving voice to a fact holding outside the game: the fact that 
the props are in such and such a condition, viz., the fact that makes 
[what we pretend to assert] a proper thing to pretend to assert.3 
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You could say, ‘The pie is too big to fit in the oven’, to give voice to the real-
world fact that the mud-cake is too big to fit in the tree-stump.  
According to Yablo, metaphors are like pretend-assertions used for this 
purpose. A metaphor suggests a game of make-believe in which what is 
described metaphorically is used as a prop. If you describe Italy as a boot, that 
suggests a game in which Italy is used as a boot-prop. By using a metaphor, 
we represent what we describe as having properties that would make our 
utterance appropriate in a game suggested by the metaphor.4 
A metaphor is ‘pretence-worthy’ when the object does have properties 
that would make our utterance appropriate in such a game. For example, 
‘Crotone is in the arch of the Italian boot’ is pretence-worthy because Italy and 
Crotone have properties that make it appropriate to imagine, in a game in 
which Italy is used as a boot-prop, that Crotone is in its arch. What Yablo calls 
the ‘metaphorical content’ of a metaphor is given by the worlds in which the 
same sentence, meaning the very same thing, is pretence-worthy.5 
Yablo argues that some metaphors are ‘representationally essential’. 
That is, there is no way to access the ‘ensembles of worlds picked out by their 
shared property of legitimating a certain pretence’ except via metaphor: 
the language might have no more to offer in the way of a unifying 
principle for the worlds in a given content than that they are the ones 
making the relevant sentence fictional. It seems at least an open 
question, for example, whether the clouds we call angry are the ones 
that are literally F, for any F other than ‘such that it would be natural 
  3 
and proper to regard them as angry if one were going to attribute 
emotions to clouds’.6 
So Yablo’s version of the Indispensability Thesis is the claim that some 
metaphors are indispensable means of accessing the ensembles of worlds that 
they enable us to access. His support for this conclusion is the claim that, for 
some metaphors, there is no unifying principle for the ensemble of worlds 
they enable us to access.7 However, if Yablo is right about the connection 
between metaphor and make-believe, then this premise is false.  
If Yablo is right, then the ensemble of worlds we access by 
characterizing Italy metaphorically as a boot is the ensemble of worlds in 
which Italy is suitable for use as a boot-prop. That, however, provides a 
unifying principle for that ensemble: what unifies them is that they are the 
worlds in which Italy is suitable for use as a boot-prop.8 A similar unifying 
principle must be available for any ensemble of worlds to which a metaphor 
gives us access, if Yablo is right about the connection between metaphor and 
make-believe. It will always be the set of worlds in which what is 
characterized metaphorically is suitable for use as a certain kind of prop. So if 
he is right about metaphor and make-believe, the premise on which he rests 
his claim that some metaphors are indispensable means of accessing certain 
ensembles of worlds is false.   
Yablo might reply that, although this premise of his argument is false, 
this is not a serious problem. Granted, the principle I have mentioned would 
be a unifying principle. It would be a uniquely specifying description of the 
ensemble of worlds to which the metaphor gives us access. But it does not 
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itself give us access to that ensemble of worlds. The metaphor, by contrast, 
does give us such access. And we need certain metaphors in order to access 
the worlds they enable us to access.   
Evidently, the plausibility of these claims depends on what ‘accessing’ 
an ensemble of worlds amounts to. For one thing, it had better not be the case 
that being able to tell whether or not a world belongs to an ensemble E is 
sufficient for accessing E. We would be able to tell this if (i) we knew that the 
worlds in E are all and only the worlds in which (for example) Italy would be 
a suitable boot-prop, and (ii) we were able to tell whether a world is one in 
which Italy is suitable for use as such a prop. To have such knowledge and to 
have (and exercise) such an ability, we do not need to use a metaphor. It may 
be, of course, that we have the ability to use metaphor only if we have the 
ability to judge a thing’s suitability as a prop in a game. But that does not 
imply, nor is it true, that we need to use a metaphor in order to judge whether 
something would be a good prop in a game.  
Alternatively, Yablo might claim that to access a set of worlds is to 
grasp a proposition. And whatever proposition is communicated by the 
metaphor ‘Italy is a boot’, it is clearly not the proposition that Italy is suitable 
for use as a boot-prop. After all, we wouldn’t normally use such a metaphor 
in order to make a point about how Italy could be used as a prop. Rather, the 
proposition communicated is true iff Italy is suitable for use as a boot-prop. 
But to grasp the proposition communicated by the metaphor is not to grasp 
the proposition that Italy is suitable for use as a boot-prop. Therefore, 
although the principle I mention above would be a uniquely specifying 
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description of the set of worlds in which the proposition communicated by 
the metaphor is true, it would not give us access to them. It would not 
communicate the same proposition. 
There are two things to say in response to this defence. First, it is true 
that the proposition communicated when we say (for example), ‘Italy is 
suitable for use as a boot-prop’, is not (normally) communicated with the 
metaphor, ‘Italy is a boot’. And I certainly do not mean that what is stated 
with the former sentence would be communicated with the metaphor. I mean 
that such cases provide counterexamples to Yablo’s claim that there is 
sometimes no unifying principle for the ensembles of worlds that, on his 
account, metaphor enables us to access.  
Second, even if ‘grasping a proposition’ is what Yablo means by 
‘accessing an ensemble of worlds’, there is a further problem with his 
position. The further problem is that the argument he gives fails to support 
the conclusion that some metaphors communicate propositions that cannot be 
communicated without metaphor. Suppose there is no literally ascribable 
property such that:  
(i)  All clouds properly called ‘angry’ share it, and  
(ii) We are characterizing clouds as having it when we call clouds 
‘angry’. 
This is a way of strengthening Yablo’s claim that there is no unifying principle 
for the worlds to which some metaphors give us access. This premise, unlike 
the original claim about unifying principles for worlds, does appear to be 
true.  
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 But this does not show that ‘angry’ is ever used to attribute a property 
that cannot be attributed without metaphor. It does not show that metaphor is 
ever used to communicate an (otherwise incommunicable) proposition about 
clouds. Rather, it may simply indicate that ‘angry’ can be used to attribute 
different properties on different occasions of its use as a metaphorical 
characterization of clouds. Many (perhaps all) expressions used 
metaphorically are like this. For example, the people we call ‘green’ can be 
inexperienced, or sick-looking, or youthful. There is no literally ascribable 
property such that they all share it and we are characterizing people as 
having it every time we call someone ‘green’. But plainly, this is not because 
we are using metaphor to attribute a property that cannot be attributed 
without metaphor. 
 Other examples are easily found. When John Major is described 
metaphorically as ‘grey’, he is characterized very differently than a ‘grey area’ 
in morality or law is. Muhammad Ali called Joe Frazier a ‘gorilla’ as an insult; 
a primate scientist might use the same expression as a compliment, 
characterizing someone as gentle and peace-loving. And as for clouds, they 
are sometimes described as ‘angry’ to indicate that they appear to be storm-
clouds, and sometimes to indicate that they look like something angry; and 
many other uses are surely possible.9 This does not support the conclusion 
that we ever use ‘angry’ metaphorically to communicate a proposition 
incommunicable without metaphor. 
Yablo also holds that some metaphors are ‘procedurally essential’. He 
argues that sometimes, the metaphor-user is not (or not merely) using 
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metaphor to communicate a certain message that she has in mind, but to 
prompt her audience to discover things of which she herself may be unaware:   
Someone who utters S in a metaphorical vein is recommending the 
project of (i) looking for games in which S is a promising move, and (ii) 
accepting the propositions that are S’s inverse images in those games 
under the modes of presentation that they provide. The overriding 
principle here is make the most of it; construe a metaphorical utterance in 
terms of the game or games that retromap it onto the most plausible 
and instructive contents in the most satisfying ways.10 
 Now, we do need the concept of a game of make-believe to carry out 
this procedure. But we do not need to use S metaphorically in order to think 
of games within which S is a promising move, nor to think of what plausible 
and instructive propositions would have to be true for it to be a promising 
move. After all, for S to be a promising move within a game is for it to be 
appropriate to use S literally within a game of make-believe involving the 
object as a prop. At least, judging by what Walton and Yablo say, for ‘Crotone 
is in the arch of the boot’ to be pretence-worthy is for it to be appropriate to 
pretend to assert, literally, that Crotone is in the arch of the boot. To use S 
literally within a game is, obviously, not to use it metaphorically within the 
game. Neither is it to use S metaphorically outside the game. An actor playing 
a character who is speaking literally is not himself speaking metaphorically. 
So if I invite you to think of games in which S is a promising move, I am 
thereby inviting you to think of scenarios in which it would be appropriate to 
use S in a certain non-metaphorical way. If there is a sound argument to show 
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that, in order to think of scenarios in which S is used in this non-metaphorical 
way, we must use S metaphorically, Yablo does not provide it. Even if Yablo 
and Walton are right that some metaphors ought to be understood in terms of 
games of make-believe, nothing they say shows that we need metaphor to 
think of the games metaphors suggest. Therefore, even if these games are 
indispensable for some purpose that metaphor achieves, it does not follow 
that metaphor is too.  
 
II 
Berys Gaut holds that metaphors used in art criticism are often 
indispensable.11 Thinking of the metaphor, according to Gaut, is often the 
only way to have the experience the metaphor provides. This is ‘because of 
the role of metaphor in classification’,12 and because the way we classify 
affects the way we experience.  
He asks us to imagine that a critic gets us to attend to various 
properties of a Kandinsky by describing it as ‘alive with movement’: 
The metaphor classifies together a motley bunch of properties: 
properties of vibrancy, subdued violence, extreme contrasts of 
saturation and hue, having jagged edges, acentric composition, a sense 
of fluctuation in pictorial depth, and so on. … How does one decide 
how to extend this list? There is such diversity here that we have no 
sense of how to carry on – except by use of the master-metaphor of 
being alive with movement. And certainly there is no reason to classify 
together these diverse properties other than because of their connection 
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to the metaphor. So the metaphor cannot be discarded: it guides our 
ability to group these properties with each other, grounds our sense 
that they belong together. 
Further, we are aware not just that these properties belong 
together, but also that what makes this the case is that they are all 
connected to the metaphor.13  
So Gaut’s claim is that we need the metaphor of the Kandinsky as alive 
with movement in order to: 
(a) tell us ‘how to carry on’ extending the list of properties he 
mentions;  
(b) ground ‘our sense that they belong together’; and  
(c) tell us why they belong together. 
The basis for this is the claim that ‘there is no reason to classify together these 
diverse properties other than because of their connection to the metaphor’.  
But this premise is false. There is another reason to classify together the 
properties the metaphor classifies together: they are all connected to the 
property, being alive with movement. They are connected to it in various ways. 
Some of the properties of the forms are also properties of creatures alive with 
movement (e.g., causing a sense of fluctuation, violence). Others are 
properties in virtue of which the forms share properties with creatures alive 
with movement: extreme contrasts of saturation and hue, for example, can 
make forms seem to leap out at us, and vibrant colours can arrest our 
attention. Still others are properties the picture shares with pictures of things 
alive with movement: acentric composition can be used (along with other 
  10 
features) to show that what is depicted is moving fast, and jagged edges can 
be used to suggest erratic motion, or the path of something moving 
erratically.   
If the properties the metaphor draws to our attention are all connected 
to the property of being alive with movement, then this undermines Gaut’s 
argument for the Indispensability Thesis. For in that case, knowing what 
properties are connected to the property of being alive with movement, and 
being able to identify them in the Kandinsky, would:  
(a) tell us how to carry on extending the list of properties he mentions, 
(b) ground our sense that they belong together, and  
(c) tell us why they belong together.  
And one can have such knowledge and exercise such an ability without the 
metaphor of the Kandinsky as alive with movement. 
Gaut comes close to acknowledging that the properties a metaphor 
classifies together are connected to something other than the metaphor. He 
writes:  
A person who classified together all and only artworks we call ‘sad’, 
but denied any connection between them and sadness, would have 
failed to grasp the aesthetic property we were indicating – would have 
failed to grasp the sadness of these things, and so would have missed 
what was of primary interest to us. Hence there could not be a person 
whose experience and understanding of a work was as ours is, but 
who did not have a grasp of the metaphor in terms of which we 
classify features of the work.14 
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The conclusion does not follow. The fact that you must accept that there is a 
connection between certain artworks and sadness in order to grasp the 
sadness of those works does not show that you need a metaphor to grasp their 
sadness. It only shows that you need the concept of sadness to do so.   
 
 
III 
Elisabeth Camp argues that ‘Not everything that can be meant can 
necessarily be given literal expression, even in a private language’.15 
Sometimes, according to Camp, we need metaphor to express, and not merely 
to communicate to others, what we use it to express. 
 Developing considerations advanced by Richard Boyd,16 Camp asks us 
to suppose that we are scientists investigating sub-personal cognitive 
processes. We want to identify a certain kind of causally efficacious property. 
However, we don’t know much about properties of this kind. We know 
something about the property’s causal relations, but not enough to define it in 
functional terms; nor can we identify the properties ostensively.   
 This is where metaphor comes in. Camp writes: 
We can still make theoretical and experimental progress, though, by 
thinking metaphorically – for example, by exploiting the metaphor of 
memory storage and retrieval as the opening of a computer file…. 
Research progresses, in part, by investigating specific candidate 
similarities that might underwrite the analogical equations that are 
implicit in such metaphors. As we establish some similarities and rule 
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out others, our cognitive access to the properties under investigation 
becomes more fully and literally conceptualized. At some point, if 
investigation progresses well, we may well be able to dispense with the 
metaphor in favor of a new, literally applicable concept. But at this 
early stage of our inquiry, the metaphor plays an essential role in fixing 
what we are thinking about.17  
On the contrary: at no stage do we need metaphor to do what Camp is 
describing. Consider what the scientist is doing. She is investigating whether 
memory has certain properties that it would share with the process of 
opening a computer file if it has them. Her research is guided by the 
hypothesis that memory does share properties with the process of opening a 
computer file. On the basis of this hypothesis, she tries to establish, for 
various properties that memory would share with this process if it has them, 
whether memory does have them.   
 To conduct her research in this way, the scientist needs the concept, 
opening a computer file. She also needs to know what properties the process of 
opening a computer file has. But she does not need metaphor, at any stage, in 
order to do this. The fact that the concept of opening a computer file plays an 
essential role in this process misleads Camp and Boyd into claiming that the 
metaphor of memory as the opening of a computer file does.   
  Camp responds to an objection like the one I have presented. She 
considers the objection that we might make explicit the implicit analogical 
equation through which the metaphor fixes the property we want to 
investigate by using a literal description, such as: 
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(8) The property of cognition that causes memory retrieval in a manner 
that is analogous in some theoretically relevant respect to opening a 
folder in a computer program.18  
Her response is that  
identifying the denotation of a literal description like (8) requires the 
same cognitive capacity as the original metaphor does. We still need to 
identify which particular similarities are relevant, and then construct a 
positive concept of the appropriate property on that basis.19 
But this response does not vindicate the Indispensability Thesis. If correct, it 
shows at most that a capacity required for the comprehension of metaphor is 
also required, in this situation, in order to fix what we are thinking about. It 
does not show what her argument purports to show: that metaphor itself, in 
this situation, plays an essential role in fixing what we are thinking about.    
 
IV 
In these cases, philosophers hold that we need metaphor in order to φ. I 
have replied that, if we do use metaphor to φ, then we do not need metaphor 
in order to φ. I have argued for this by pointing out other ways of φ-ing. If I 
am right that there are other ways in which we can φ, that is sufficient to show 
that the version of the Indispensability Thesis in question is untrue.      
But it is also noteworthy that, in several of these cases, there is 
something else we clearly do need in order to φ. We need the concept of 
sadness in one of the cases Gaut discusses,20 and the scientist needs the 
concept of opening a computer file in order to conduct her research in the 
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way Camp describes. We need, in such cases, what I shall call ‘the concept 
applied metaphorically’. The concept applied metaphorically is the concept 
literally expressed by the expression being used metaphorically: so, for 
example, the concept of being alive with movement is applied metaphorically 
in the metaphor of the Kandinsky as alive with movement. The discussion 
above suggests that at least part of the reason the Indispensability Thesis 
seems plausible to some of its supporters is that they are confusing the 
concept applied metaphorically with the metaphor itself.  
This diagnosis is supported by another consideration. Advocates of the 
Indispensability Thesis not only say that metaphor is essential for a certain 
purpose when, in fact, it is the concept applied metaphorically that is 
essential. The cases in which some of them allow that metaphor is dispensable 
for some purpose are cases in which this concept is dispensable for that 
purpose.  
Roger Scruton, for example, writes: 
I can spell out homo homini lupus [man is a wolf to man], for instance, 
by describing the known facts of man’s aggression towards his 
fellows…. For all intents and purposes, it is dispensable.21   
Frank Sibley makes the following comment on a metaphor used to describe a 
wine, ‘it will never win a race but it’s a wonderful little jogger’:  
We know exactly the prosaic meaning of this last one: ‘not top class but 
a satisfying day-to-day tipple you won’t get tired of’. Here the 
metaphor performs no irreplaceable function; it is dispensable….22  
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These metaphors are indeed dispensable. And there is indeed a difference 
between these metaphors and others. But the difference is not that these 
metaphors are dispensable and others are not.   
 When we use these metaphors, if Scruton and Sibley are right about 
them, we are not primarily interested in the fact that the item described 
metaphorically shares certain properties with what the concept applied in the 
metaphor literally applies to (or, if talk of being interested in facts is 
inappropriate here: we are not primarily interested in their sharing of certain 
properties23). Rather, we are primarily interested in the fact that what is 
metaphorically described has these properties (or: in their having these 
properties). A user of homo homini lupus, for example, is not primarily 
interested in the fact that people share the property of aggressiveness with 
wolves. Rather, she is mainly interested in the fact that people are aggressive 
towards each other. Similarly, the wine critic is not primarily interested in 
communicating that the wine’s failure to be top-class, and its being 
consistently good nevertheless, are properties it shares with wonderful little 
joggers who will never win a race. Her point, if Sibley is right, is that it has 
these features.  
Sometimes, however, we are primarily interested in the item’s sharing 
of features when we use a metaphor. Bernini’s colonnade around St Peter’s 
Square has been described as ‘the arms of the Church, embracing her flock’. It 
has a shape of a kind that embracing arms also have. The point of describing 
it as ‘the arms of the Church’, however, is not merely to draw attention to that 
shape. It is to point out that the colonnade shares that shape with pairs of 
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embracing arms. Appreciating the colonnade involves noticing this, for the 
building expresses welcome by sharing a shape with a gesture that does.  
By saying this, I am not committing myself to the view that a 
proposition about the sharing of properties is part of the content of some or 
all metaphors. I am not, for example, advancing or relying on the claim that 
the embracing-arms metaphor expresses the proposition that Bernini’s 
colonnade shares that shape with pairs of embracing arms. My point is that 
metaphors at least sometimes draw our attention or direct our thoughts to the 
sharing of properties. It is not that they always have this effect, or that they 
ever do it by expressing a proposition about property-sharing. Sometimes the 
metaphor-user is primarily interested in having this effect, and sometimes she 
is not. Davidson, who certainly would not accept that a proposition about the 
sharing of properties is part of the content of a metaphor, could accept the 
claim I am making here. It is a point only about what the reader or hearer of a 
metaphor is sometimes made to notice or think about, and about what effects 
the metaphor-user is interested in having. It is not a point about what 
metaphors mean.  
Now, what is true of the metaphors Scruton and Sibley discuss is that, 
to do what we are mainly interested in doing with them, we do not need the 
concepts applied metaphorically. To point out what the user of homo homini 
lupus is primarily interested in pointing out (people’s aggressiveness, etc.), the 
metaphor-user needn’t use the concept of a wolf. This leads some 
philosophers to say that, in such cases, she needn’t use the metaphor to 
communicate what she wants. As it happens, this is true; but it is the same 
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confusion of metaphors with concepts applied metaphorically that leads them 
to say it.  
By contrast, to do what we are interested in doing with the metaphor 
of Bernini’s colonnade as the arms of the Church, we need the concept of 
embracing arms. So there is a genuine distinction to be made among 
metaphors with respect to the dispensability of the concept applied 
metaphorically. But if we need to use the concept applied metaphorically in 
order to φ, it does not follow that we need to use it by applying it 
metaphorically.  
  
V 
It is important to be clear about what is at issue when metaphors are 
said to be indispensable.   
First, there are trivially true versions of the Indispensability Thesis, and 
these are plainly not at issue. For some things we use metaphor to think, to 
express, to communicate, or to discover, it is trivially true that we need 
metaphor in order to think, express, communicate, or discover them. For 
example, we obviously cannot discover, without at least thinking of 
metaphor, that a given metaphor draws our attention to a certain feature or 
fact. The modality of the version of the Indispensability Thesis being 
advocated also affects how interesting that version is. Friends of 
indispensability sometimes distinguish their position from the view that 
metaphor is sometimes needed to communicate something we merely happen 
to lack non-metaphorical means of communicating.24 If we lack such non-
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metaphorical means, but could easily develop them (and do so without 
metaphor), that would not establish the truth of an especially interesting 
version of the thesis. Beyond this, however, advocates of the thesis do not 
always make clear the modality of the version they advocate. 
Second, the Indispensability Thesis is not a claim about the manner in 
which we think, express, communicate, or discover things when we use 
metaphor to do so. Where φ-ing ranges over thinking, expressing, 
communicating and discovering, it is not the view that we could not φ in such-
and-such a way without metaphor. It is the view that what we φ with some 
metaphors cannot be φ’ed without metaphor.   
One might hold, to take one example, that a single metaphor can 
communicate many propositions, and that these propositions are emphasized 
to different degrees when we use the metaphor to communicate them. One 
might also hold that there is no other way to communicate those propositions 
with just that distribution of emphasis. An oft-quoted complaint Max Black 
makes about the attempt to state the content of certain metaphors in plain 
language is that when we attempt to do so, the metaphor’s ‘implications, 
previously left for a suitable reader to educe for himself, with a nice feeling 
for their relative priorities and degrees of importance, are now presented 
explicitly as though having equal weight’.25 The Indispensability Thesis is not 
the view that metaphor is indispensable for communicating in this, or any 
other, manner.  
Third, I have so far said nothing about the paraphrasability of 
metaphors. Several philosophers hold that at least some metaphors cannot be 
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paraphrased. One might think that this claim implies the truth of the 
Indispensability Thesis. This would be a mistake. In fact, the claim that some 
metaphors cannot be paraphrased does not imply the truth of the 
Indispensability Thesis, although the claim that we use metaphor to 
communicate or to express what cannot be communicated or expressed 
without metaphor (which is a version of the Indispensability Thesis) implies 
that metaphors cannot be paraphrased.26 There are several philosophers 
whose views commit them to the claim that metaphors cannot be 
paraphrased, but not to the Indispensability Thesis. 
Davidson, for example, holds that a paraphrase would give the non-
literal meaning or special cognitive content of the metaphor. But according to 
him, metaphors have no non-literal meaning or special cognitive content. 
Therefore, they cannot be paraphrased. He writes: 
I agree with the view that metaphors cannot be paraphrased, but I 
think this is not because metaphors say something too novel for literal 
expression but because there is nothing there to paraphrase. … 
metaphor can, like a picture or a bump on the head, make us 
appreciate some fact – but not by standing for, or expressing, the fact.  
 If this is right, what we attempt in ‘paraphrasing’ a metaphor 
cannot be to give its meaning, for that lies on the surface; rather we 
attempt to evoke what the metaphor brings to our attention.27 
Davidson is committed to the view that metaphors cannot be paraphrased 
(although he acknowledges that there is a point to the activity we call 
‘paraphrase’). But he is not committed to the Indispensability Thesis. He does 
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not claim that there is a content expressed or communicated by metaphor that 
no non-metaphorical paraphrase can express or communicate. He claims that 
there is no special cognitive content expressed or communicated by metaphor. 
From this, it follows that metaphors cannot be paraphrased. But it also 
follows that metaphors are not indispensable for the expression or 
communication of such a content. Of course, if Davidson had said that what 
metaphor brings to our attention cannot be discovered without metaphor, 
then he would be committed to the Indispensability Thesis; but he makes no 
such claim. 
To take another example: Samuel Guttenplan regards it as wrong to 
take ‘“paraphrasing X” to be more or less equivalent to “saying what X tells 
us or means.”’28 You can say what a photograph tells us, but you cannot 
paraphrase one. Rather, citing the OED, Guttenplan stresses that ‘a 
paraphrase is a “re-statement of the sense of a passage in other words.”’29 
Since it is a re-statement of a thought in other words than those in which the 
original expressed the thought, one can only paraphrase something that 
expressed a thought in words in the first place. And ‘since a photograph, 
whatever it tells us, is not itself in words, it is inappropriate to paraphrase 
it’.30 
On Guttenplan’s view, metaphors similarly do not express thoughts in 
words. Rather, ‘it is words in the metaphor that call on … [an] object’, and it is 
what Guttenplan calls ‘the “proto-predicate”, object included, which conveys 
a message, not the words themselves’.31 The burden of Guttenplan’s theory of 
metaphor is to explain these ideas and to show how speakers can use objects 
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in this way. It is unnecessary to enter into the details of it here. The point is 
that he draws from his theory the moral that, as in the case of photographs, ‘it 
would be bizarre to ask someone to express this same information in other 
words. … Since the speaker is using an object, not words, to convey a message, 
it makes no sense even to try to paraphrase a metaphor in the strict sense of 
the term’.32 
It would follow from the truth of Guttenplan’s theory that metaphors 
cannot be paraphrased in the sense he identifies. But here too, it would not 
follow that metaphor is indispensable. One would need to argue that the 
thoughts expressed by metaphor could not be expressed without metaphor. 
Establishing that the thoughts expressed by metaphor are not expressed by 
the metaphor in words, and therefore that nothing can count as expressing 
these thoughts in other words, does not show this. 
It sometimes goes unrecognized that the impossibility of paraphrase 
does not entail the indispensability of metaphor for communication or 
expression. 
Camp, for instance, holds that a paraphrase of a metaphor must state 
only ‘the content of the speaker’s intended illocutionary act’ and therefore 
‘should not … include contents the speaker merely insinuated, or merely 
caused her hearer to entertain’.33 Moreover, in a paraphrase the content is 
stated ‘in a literal and explicit fashion’: that is, the paraphrase ‘should enable 
an otherwise linguistically competent speaker to understand the original 
utterance’s content simply in virtue of understanding the meanings of the 
paraphrasing sentence’s constituent terms and their mode of combination’.34  
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She defends the idea that certain metaphors cannot be paraphrased (at 
least in certain circumstances) by arguing that various plausible candidates 
fail to meet the criteria she sets for paraphrase. But if these arguments succeed 
in showing that such metaphors cannot be paraphrased in her sense, they still 
do not establish the Indispensability Thesis. To establish that, one must 
establish that we do something with metaphor that we cannot do without 
metaphor. Camp’s arguments show, at most, that in many circumstances we 
communicate with metaphor something we cannot communicate by making a 
statement meeting the criteria she sets for being a paraphrase. Camp, 
however, takes her argument to establish the stronger view that we 
sometimes cannot communicate certain contents without metaphor. 
 She considers this example: 
(7) When he finally walked out the door, I was left standing on the top 
of an icy mountain crag, with nothing around me but thin cold air, bare 
white cliffs, and a blindingly clear blue sky.  
‘Here’, she says, ‘the speaker is claiming to have experienced a specific 
property, one for which the language has no existing expression, and one 
which the hearer has not (let us suppose) experienced himself’.35 Now, in this 
situation, Camp grants that ‘the speaker herself is still not forced to speak 
metaphorically’.36 The speaker could have said: 
(72) I felt an emotion which was like the way it would feel physically to 
stand on top of an icy mountain crag … 
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Statements like these, however, ‘still rely at least implicitly on the original 
metaphor, and so they fail to provide explicit formulations of the speaker’s 
meaning’: 
if ‘like’ expresses a substantive relation which holds just in case a 
particular, contextually salient similarity holds between the two objects 
… then (72) implicitly builds those similarities into its content. It may 
then succeed in capturing the speaker’s intended content, but it 
arguably also fails to be fully explicit, in much the way that ‘He’s 
ready’ fails to specify its implicit argument.37  
 But this does not show that (72) ‘relies at least implicitly on the original 
metaphor’. It shows, at most, that (72) fails to meet the requirement that a 
paraphrase must state the content of the metaphor-user’s intended 
illocutionary act explicitly. It would therefore fail to be a paraphrase, in 
Camp’s sense. But for all Camp says here, using (72), in this context, 
communicates the content of the metaphor-user’s intended illocutionary act 
implicitly. Communicating this content implicitly is different from implicitly 
relying on a metaphor that communicates the same content.   
She also considers 
(73) I experienced an emotion which is like the physical feeling of 
standing on an icy mountain crag … in respects i, j, k …  
The problem with this is that,  
construed as a paraphrase, (73) attributes unintended content to the 
speaker. In uttering (7), the speaker isn’t making any claims about 
what icy mountain crags are like or about their relation to her 
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emotional state – she’s just characterizing her emotion, using shared 
attitudes about icy mountain crags to do so. Her intended claim has the 
form: ‘When he left, I felt that way’. … These facts [about crags] may be 
part of the implicit background conditions which enable the speaker to 
employ this metaphor as a vehicle for communicating that content, but 
they aren’t actually part of that content itself.38 
(73), in short, violates the requirement that a paraphrase must state only the 
content of the speaker’s intended illocutionary act. 
  Again, this may show that (73) fails to be a paraphrase. It does not 
show that by using (73) we would fail to communicate what the metaphor 
does. Nor does it show, more generally, that if we stated (or otherwise relied 
on) the background conditions enabling the metaphor to communicate what it 
does, we could not then communicate the same content without using 
metaphor. For all Camp shows, we can rely on the same background 
conditions as the metaphor without relying on the metaphor itself.39  
  These would not be problems if Camp wanted to establish only that 
there are unparaphrasable metaphors. But she wants also to establish that 
there are indispensable metaphors. Camp holds that metaphor is needed for 
successful communication in situations like that in which she imagines (7) 
being used: ones in which the language lacks an expression for the property 
the metaphor-user has in mind, and in which the hearer has not experienced 
the property (which, she says, prevents the speaker using any demonstrative 
that would enable the hearer to identify the property). She takes the 
impossibility of paraphrase in these situations to show that, ‘even if she avails 
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herself of all possible literal means’ of coining a word for the property, the 
speaker  
could not introduce that word into the language, because her hearer 
would be in no position to comprehend it – not as a result of linguistic 
incompetence, or irrationality, but just from a lack of worldly 
experience. … It is of course true that after the speaker has gotten her 
hearer to identify the relevant property by metaphorical means, she can 
then introduce a new term which denotes it. … But because the 
metaphor here plays an essential role in defining the new term, this 
possibility cannot be used to show that metaphor in general is 
theoretically eliminable. Although each particular metaphor can 
eventually be eliminated, the situation exemplified by (7) can always 
arise anew for a different property.40  
But as I have argued, nothing Camp says about paraphrase shows that all 
possible literal means will fail to enable the hearer to identify the relevant 
property, even in the situation exemplified by (7). She shows at most that her 
candidate paraphrases fail to be paraphrases, not that they fail to enable the 
hearer to identify the relevant property without relying implicitly on the 
metaphor. And if she does not establish that metaphor is essential for 
communication in this situation, she also does not establish that metaphor 
plays an essential role in defining a new term for the property.  
  What implies the truth of the Indispensability Thesis, then, is not the 
thesis that metaphors cannot be paraphrased. It is the claim (i) that metaphors 
do communicate or express something, and the claim (ii) that there is no non-
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metaphorical way of communicating or expressing what the metaphor does. 
Of course, if paraphrase just is the expression by non-metaphorical means of 
what the metaphor expresses, or the communication by non-metaphorical 
means of what the metaphor communicates, then the impossibility of 
paraphrase plus claim (i) together imply the truth of the Indispensability 
Thesis. But it is important to recognize that that is what paraphrase must be in 
order for the denial of the possibility of paraphrase and claim (i) to imply the 
truth of the Indispensability Thesis. And it is, as we have seen, not universally 
acknowledged that this is what a paraphrase is. 
 Finally, there is the question of the value of metaphor. Nothing I have 
said casts any doubt on the idea that some metaphors express what they do 
more beautifully, powerfully, or succinctly than any other form of words 
could. That view, being one about the manner in which metaphors express 
what they do, is distinct from the Indispensability Thesis. Many writers seem 
to hold that they must defend the Indispensability Thesis in order to defend 
the claim that metaphor is of great value. If metaphor is one among several 
possible ways of communicating or expressing what it does, then (the 
assumption seems to be) it is of minor importance. Scruton insists that 
metaphors are indispensable ‘not merely because they are part of some 
unique literary experience’,41 and Black stresses that metaphor provides more 
than ‘the incidental pleasures of stating figuratively what might just as well 
have been said literally’.42  
Such impatience with the idea that great metaphors are valuable 
‘merely’ because of their power, beauty, vividness, and so forth is curious. 
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Pointing out that a piece of writing is an imaginative, beautiful, vigorous, 
clear and concise way of communicating something, as many metaphors are, 
is normally sufficient to show that it is a very valuable way of 
communicating. If someone were to show that there is a dull, laboured and 
rambling way of communicating the same thing, we would not conclude that 
the original way of putting things is of little value. We would certainly not 
conclude that what we communicated ‘might just as well have been said’ in 
the dull way. Perhaps it is because philosophers are so often concerned with 
questions of truth and knowledge that they are inclined to defend metaphor 
by arguing that it is essential for the expression or discovery of certain truths.   
 
VI 
I have not, of course, demonstrated that the Indispensability Thesis is 
false. Rather, I have shown that various arguments for it do not succeed, and I 
have distinguished it from a variety of claims with which it is easily confused. 
As I said at the beginning, however, many philosophers do not even attempt 
to argue for the Indispensability Thesis. They simply assert that metaphors 
are indispensable. This being so, it may be that some will respond to my 
discussion so far in the following way: perhaps these arguments do fail, but is 
it not obvious that some metaphors are indispensable? Arguments for the 
Indispensability Thesis, it may be felt, are unnecessary. Metaphors come in a 
dazzling variety of forms apart from the simple ‘X is Y’ form. Not only 
predicates, but nouns and adjectives outside predicates can be used 
metaphorically. Consider complex poetic metaphors such as:   
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 Cast thy bread upon the waters: for thou shalt find it after many days.43 
  
… selfwrung, selfstrung, sheathe- and shelterless, thoughts against  
thoughts in groans grind.44 
  
There is shadow under this red rock,  
(Come in under the shadow of this red rock),  
And I will show you something different from either  
Your shadow at morning striding behind you  
Or your shadow at evening rising to meet you;  
I will show you fear in a handful of dust.45 
 
Is it not obvious that we could not express what these express in any other 
way?  
I have not shown that these philosophers are wrong. What I hope to 
have shown is that asking rhetorical questions like this is not good enough. 
Advocates of the Indispensability Thesis do need to provide arguments for it. 
If the arguments that are given for it so often turn out to be based on 
confusion, we have reason to be suspicious of our sense (if we have it) that 
very apt, striking, or complex metaphors are indispensable for the purposes 
claimed by advocates of the Indispensability Thesis. I have so far provided six 
grounds for suspicion.  
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First, I have shown that the indispensability of a concept of something 
in terms of which metaphor is explained (e.g., the concept of a game of make-
believe) is sometimes confused with the indispensability of metaphor itself. 
Second, the indispensability of the concept applied metaphorically is often 
confused with the indispensability of metaphor itself. Third, the fact that we 
happen to lack expressions with which to attribute a certain property non-
metaphorically, and the fact that we can attribute it with metaphor, would not 
by themselves establish an interesting version of the Indispensability Thesis. 
Fourth, the fact that we use some metaphors to φ in a manner in which we 
could not φ without metaphor would not show that they are indispensable for 
φ-ing. Fifth, the unparaphrasability of metaphor is sometimes confused with 
the indispensability of metaphor. Sixth, the fact that some metaphors are 
tremendously valuable ways of communicating and expressing things is 
consistent with the claim that they are dispensable for these purposes.  
In short, supporters of the thesis need to argue for it because they need 
to show that they are avoiding these common confusions. It is not simply 
obvious that certain metaphors are indispensable, because it is not simply 
obvious that our sense of the indispensability of certain metaphors is not due 
to one of these confusions. Argument is required to show this.   
There is also a more general ground for suspicion. As we have seen, 
metaphors are indispensable for communication or expression only if they do 
communicate or express something. In addition, to know that a given 
metaphor is indispensable, we need to know what it expresses. If you do not 
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know what a given metaphor expresses, you cannot claim that what it 
expresses could not be expressed without metaphor.  
This consideration shows that not just any complex or poetic metaphor 
can be used as evidence for the Indispensability Thesis. It must be one that we 
understand: we must know what it expresses. But many difficult metaphors 
are difficult precisely because it is unclear what they express. Philosophers 
often write as though we find difficult metaphors puzzling only because we 
find it hard to put them into other words. In fact, we often puzzle over 
difficult poetic metaphors because we are unsure what they are expressing. 
Take Eliot’s metaphor, ‘I will show you fear in a handful of dust’. Perhaps 
some people know what this expresses. But I expect that for many of us it is 
not clear. This does not mean we have no suspicion about what it expresses; 
and we do know, of certain thoughts, that the metaphor is definitely not 
expressing them. We may know what kind of subject-matter it is expressing 
something about. But all of this is consistent with not knowing what it does 
express. And if we do not know what it expresses, then we do not know that 
it expresses something inexpressible without metaphor.  
Suppose, then, that we have examples of metaphors that express 
something, and we do know what they express, and they seem indispensable. 
There is a seventh reason why we need an argument for their 
indispensability.  
If metaphors express or communicate anything, then presumably they 
characterize something. Whether a predicate, an adjective, or a noun is used 
metaphorically, what it is applied to is characterized by the metaphor. This 
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being so, the metaphor must characterize it as having some property or 
properties.46 You cannot characterize anything without characterizing it as 
having some property. 
If we know what the metaphor expresses, as we must if we know that 
it is indispensable, then we know what property or properties it characterizes 
something as having. We can identify the property. Given these facts, a 
tempting but naïve way of criticizing the Indispensability Thesis would be to 
say this: if you can identify a property, then you can coin a non-metaphorical 
term for it – a name for it or a predicate or an adjective with which we can 
characterize something as having it. To think otherwise is comparable to 
thinking that there are particulars that we can identify but cannot name. 
Consequently, any metaphor that expresses something and is understood is 
dispensable: for any such metaphor characterizes something as having a 
property which we can identify, and any such property is one that we can 
characterize something as having with purely non-metaphorical terms.  
I call this response naïve because it overlooks the possibility that we 
sometimes need metaphor in order to identify certain properties in the first 
place, or to enable others to identify them. To my knowledge, no advocate of 
indispensability does explicitly and directly claim that there are properties 
such that, even when we have identified them, we cannot then name them or 
coin a predicate or adjective with which to characterize something as having 
them. Camp shows a greater awareness of this problem than many. She is 
careful to claim only that we sometimes need metaphor in order to identify a 
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property or to enable others to do so. As we have seen, however, her 
arguments do not establish this.  
So this is a seventh reason why advocates of the thesis must provide 
arguments for it. It is very implausible that we cannot coin a non-
metaphorical term for a property once we have identified it. If any metaphors 
are nevertheless indispensable for communication or expression, they must be 
needed (either by the metaphor-user or her reader) in order to identify the 
properties that they are used to characterize something as having. It is not 
simply obvious that they are needed for this, and so it is not simply obvious 
that metaphors are indispensable.  
 None of this demonstrates that the Indispensability Thesis is false. Its 
prospects, however, do not look good.47  
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